THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


STONE'S  RIVER 

The  Turning-Point  of  the  Civil  War 


By 

WILSON  J.  VANCE 


New  York 

The  Neale  Publishing  Company 
1914 


(Copyright,  1914) 
By  The  Neale  Publishing  Company 


TO  MY  WIFE 


a 

41 


ORDER  OF  CONTENTS 


Page 

1  Preface 7 

ac  Introduction   9 

g  Chapter 

I     North  and  South  in  1862 12 

II     Foreign  Relations  in  1862 21 

5?             Ill     The  Annies  and  Their  Leaders.  31 

*>             IV     The  First  Day's  Battle 44 

|              V     The  Night  and  the  Next  Day.  ..  55 

VI     The  Second  of  January,  1863  ...  59 
VII     What  Might  Have   Been, — and 

g                          What  Was 63 

x  Appendix 67 

o 

CO 


447965 


STONE'S  RIVER 


PREFACE 

While  many  authorities  were  consulted  in  the 
preparation  of  this  work,  particular  acknowledg- 
ment is  due  John  Formby's  "The  American  Civil 
War,"  wherein  was  suggested  the  proposition  that 
is  here  laid  down  and  expanded;  to  Van  Home's 
"History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  which 
gives  the  campaigns  of  that  organization  in  minute 
detail;  to  several  of  the  papers  and  books  of 
Charles  Francis  Adams, — documents  that  deal 
principally  with  the  diplomacy  of  the  Civil  War, 
and  to  the  published  and  spoken  words  of  the 
author's  father, — the  late  Wilson  Vance, — 
orderly  to  the  brigade  commander  whose  charge 
against  orders  turned  defeat  into  victory  in  the 
battle  here  described.  The  book  grows  out 
of  a  short  article  published  in  the  Newark  Sunday 
Call,  December  29,  1912, — an  article  that  at- 
tracted considerable  attention,  rather  because  of 
the  novelty  of  the  theory  advanced  than  because 
of  other  merit. 

It  may  be  permissible  to  add  that  few  persons, 
— comparatively, — conceive  the  bearing  on  the 

7 


8  STONE'S   RIVER 

outcome  of  the  Civil  War,  of  the  campaigns  and 
battles  that  took  place  beyond  the  Alleghanies. 
There  is  more  than  one  pretentious  history,  which 
would  lead  a  reader  to  suppose  that  all  of  the 
events  of  importance  took  place  upon  the  Atlantic 
seaboard.  It  does  not  diminish  in  the  least  either 
the  merit  or  the  renown  of  the  armies  that  meas- 
ured their  strength  in  that  confined  arena  to  sug- 
gest that  the  movements  that  resulted  in  the  trans- 
fer of  the  control  over  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
square  miles  of  territory, — territory  that  teemed 
with  the  fruits  of  the  earth, — was,  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  naval  blockade,  a  very  consider- 
able factor  in  the  wearing  down  and  final  collapse 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 

WILSON  J.  VANCE 
NEWARK,  N.  J.,  JULY  14,  1914. 


INTRODUCTION 

On  the  banks  of  a  shallow  winding  stream,  tra- 
versing the  region  known  as  Middle  Tennessee, 
on  the  last  day  of  December,  1862,  and  on  the 
first  and  second  days  of  January,  1863,  a  great 
battle  was  fought, — a  battle  that  marked  the  turn- 
ing point  of  the  Civil  War.  Stone's  River,  as  the 
North  designated  it,  or  Murfreesboro, — to  give 
it  the  Southern  name, — has  hitherto  not  been  es- 
timated at  its  true  importance.  To  the  people 
of  the  two  sections  it  seemed  at  the  time  but  an- 
other Shiloh, — horrifying,  saddening,  and  bitterly 
disappointing.  Its  significance,  likewise,  has 
escaped  almost  all  historians  and  military  critics. 
But  now  the  perspective  of  half  a  century  gives 
it  its  proper  place  in  the  panorama  of  the  great 
conflict. 

Gettysburg,  indeed,  may  have  been  the  wound 
mortal  of  the  Confederacy.  But  Gettysburg  was, 
in  very  truth,  a  counsel  of  desperation,  undertaken 
when  the  South  was  bleeding  from  many  a  vein. 
When  Lee  turned  the  faces  of  his  veterans  toward 
the  fruitful  fields  of  Pennsylvania,  a  wall  of  steel 
and  fire  encompassed  his  whole  country.  War- 
worn Virginia  cried  out  for  relief  from  the  march- 


io  STONE'S   RIVER 

ings  of  armies,  that  her  people  might  raise  the 
crops  that  would  save  them  from  starvation. 
Grant  had  at  last  established  his  lines  around  the 
fortress  that  dominated  the  Mississippi,  and  only 
by  such  a  diversion,  was  there  hope  that  his  death- 
grip  would  be  shaken.  The  day  after  Pickett's 
shattered  columns  had  drifted  back  to  Seminary 
Ridge  Vicksburg  was  surrendered,  and  the  control 
of  the  mighty  river  passed  to  the  forces  of  the 
North. 

But  it  was  at  Stone's  River  that  the  South  was 
at  the  very  pinnacle  of  confidence  and  warlike 
power;  and  it  was  here  that  she  was  halted  and 
beaten  back, — never  again  to  exhibit  such  strength 
and  menace.  It  was  here  that  the  tide  of  the 
Confederacy  passed  its  flood,  henceforth  to  re- 
cede; here  that  its  sun  crossed  the  meridian  and 
began  its  journey  to  the  twilight  and  the  dark. 
Southern  valor  was  manifested  in  splendid  lustre 
on  many  a  field  thereafter,  but  the  capacity  for 
sustained  aggression  was  gone.  After  Stone's 
River,  the  Southern  soldier  fought  to  repel  rather 
than  to  drive  his  foe. 

Yet  Stone's  River  was  almost  a  tale  of  triumph 
for  the  Confederacy. 

"God  has  granted  us  a  happy  New  Year!"  was 
the  message  flashed  to  Richmond  at  the  close  of 
the  first  day's  fighting  by  General  Braxton  Bragg, 
Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Two- 
thirds  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  been 


STONE'S   RIVER  n 

hurled  out  of  line,  and  now  lay  clinging  with 
desperation  to  the  only  road  from  which  it  could 
secure  supplies,  or  by  which  it  could  retreat,  and 
to  lose  which  meant  destruction.  There  was  rea- 
son, therefore,  in  the  Southern  general's  exulta- 
tion, as  he  waited  for  the  morrow  to  give  him  com- 
plete success.  He  could  not  know  that  the  army 
upon  which  had  been  inflicted  so  terrific  a  blow 
was  to  gather  new  strength  out  of  the  very  magni- 
tude of  its  disaster  and  to  return  such  a  counter- 
stroke  as  would  give  it  the  field  and  the  victory. 
Neither  could  he  see  that  his  failure  here  meant 
failure  for  his  cause;  that  because  at  Stone's  River 
success  had  not  crowned  his  efforts,  his  own  mag- 
nificent army  was  to  be  pressed  further  and  further 
from  the  territory  it  claimed  as  its  own;  that  Fate 
had  here  entered  the  decree, — against  which  all 
appeals  would  fail, — for  the  preservation  of  the 
Federal  Union  and  the  death  of  the  Confederate 
States  of  America. 

WILSON  J.  VANCE. 


CHAPTER  I 

NORTH  AND  SOUTH  IN  1862 
Confederate  enterprise,  energy,  and  expectation 
were  at  the  zenith  in  1862.  No  other  year  saw 
the  South  with  so  promising  prospects,  with  plans 
of  campaign  so  bold,  with  such  resources,  both 
latent  and  developed.  Her  armies  were  at  their 
fullest  strength,  for  the  flower  of  her  youth  had 
not  yet  been  destroyed  in  battle.  Want  and  hunger 
had  not  yet  begun  to  chill  the  hearts  of  her  people. 
Her  political  machinery,  under  the  direction  of 
able  leaders,  had  been  skillfully  adjusted  to  the 
needs  of  the  new  nation  and  was  now  working 
smoothly  and  effectually.  There  had,  indeed, 
come  a  change  of  sentiment  in  the  Southland. 
That  boastful  and  flatulent  spirit, — the  spirit  that 
contemptuously  slurred  the  strength  and  courage 
of  the  foe  and  counted  upon  an  easy  victory, — was 
gone.  In  its  place  was  a  temper  far  more  formid- 
able. The  South  realized  now  that  before  it  was 
a  task  of  greatest  magnitude,  but  her  people  rose 
to  it  in  a  spirit  of  splendid  sacrifice  and  with  high, 
stern  resolution. 

The  early  part  of  the  year,  indeed,  brought  a 
series  of  reverses,  particularly  in  the  West, — re- 

12 


STONE'S   RIVER  13 

verses  that  would  have  seemed  fatal  to  a  cause, 
less  resolutely  supported.  In  January  was  fought 
the  battle  of  Mill  Springs,  where  Thomas,  in  rout- 
ing the  Confederate  forces,  achieved  the  first  con- 
siderable Union  success  of  the  war.  In  February 
came  Grant's  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donel- 
son,  which  not  only  yielded  thousands  of  prison- 
ers but  left  Middle  Tennessee  open  to  the  invaders. 
The  same  month  witnessed  the  opening  of  oper- 
ations in  North  Carolina  by  Burnside,  which  re- 
sulted in  the  capture  of  Roanoke  Island  and  (in 
March)  of  New  Berne.  Pea  Ridge,  fought  in 
March,  dashed  Confederate  hopes  of  Missouri, — 
for  a  season, — and  the  capture  of  New  Madrid 
proved  another  heavy  loss  to  the  South,  in  men, 
guns,  and  munitions.  Early  in  April  Fort  Pulaski 
yielded  to  Gillmore,  and  McClellan's  great  army 
began  its  progress  up  the  Peninsula,  with  RicF- 
mond  as  its  announced  goal.  The  siege-artillery 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  still  thundering 
at  Williamsburg,  when,  on  May  6  and  7,  was 
fought  the  bloody  battle  of  Shiloh,  in  which  the 
Confederates, — after  a  striking  initial  success, — 
were  driven  from  the  field  by  Grant  and  Buell, 
with  the  death  of  their  loved  commander,  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston,  to  make  more  bitter  their  de- 
feat. The  echoes  of  Shiloh's  guns  had  scarcely 
ceased,  before  Island  No.  10,  with  many  prisoners 
and  supplies,  fell  to  Pope,  and  the  crowning  Con- 
federate disaster  came  on  May  28,  when  Farragut 


i4  STONE'S   RIVER 

received  the  surrender  of  New  Orleans, — trie  com- 
mercial metropolis,  the  largest  and  wealthiest  city, 
and  the  greatest  seaport  of  the  South. 

But  Confederate  prestige,  which  had  suffered 
sadly  in  these  events,  was  speedily  restored  in  full- 
est measure.  While  McClellan  was  toiling  slowly 
up  the  Peninsula,  Jackson  was  electrifying  the 
whole  South  by  his  campaign  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  where,  with  a  small  force,  he  neutralized 
armies  aggregating  70,000  men,  and  terrorized 
the  Federal  capital.  Kernstown,  Front  Royal, 
Winchester,  Cross  Keys,  and  Port  Republic,  are 
names  that  serve  to  recall  some  of  the  most  bril- 
liant exploits  of  the  war. 

His  work  in  the  valley  accomplished,  Jackson 
then  slipped  away  in  June  to  aid  Lee  in  the  battles 
around  Richmond, — battles  that  were  to  culmin- 
ate early  in  July  in  the  retreat  to  Harrison's  Land- 
ing and  the  reluctant  and  humiliating  withdrawal 
from  the  Peninsula  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
While  the  withdrawal  was  still  in  progress,  Lee 
fell  upon  the  luckless  Pope,  and  in  the  second 
Battle  of  Bull  Run  all  but  crushed  his  newly-con- 
stituted Army  of  Virginia.  Then  Lee  gave  the 
Northward  road  to  his  victorious  legions,  and 
early  in  September  began  the  invasion  of  Mary- 
land. 

After  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  the  Confederate 
forces  of  the  Middle  West, — under  Beauregard, 
— had  retired  to  Corinth,  Miss.,  which  Halleck, 


STONE'S   RIVER  15 

at  the  head  of  more  than  100,000  men, — having 
gathered  together  Grant's  army,  Buell's  and  all 
the  other  forces  under  his  command, — approached 
with  ridiculous  caution.  After  a  somewhat  farcical 
siege,  in  which  Beauregard  played  successfully  for 
time,  Corinth  was  suddenly  and  expeditiously 
evacuated,  and  the  Confederate  Army  reappeared 
in  a  strong  position  at  Tupelo,  when,  Beauregard 
having  fallen  ill,  Bragg  assumed  command. 

Halleck  now  divided  his  forces  again,  Buell, — 
at  the  head  of  what  was  now  known  as  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland, — being  sent  into  Middle  Ten- 
nessee to  begin  a  campaign  long  urged  by  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  for  the  relief  of  the  Unionists  in  the 
eastern  part  of  that  State,  and  Grant  being  left  in 
Mississippi,  with  somewhat  widely-separated  de- 
tachments, which  ultimately  he  was  to  concentrate 
in  the  campaign  for  Vicksburg.  The  taking  of 
Memphis  (June  6)  had  already  given  the  Union 
forces  a  foothold  on  the  great  river  and  domina- 
tion over  Western  Tennessee.  Halleck  was  sum- 
moned to  Washington  in  July,  to  take  command 
of  all  the  armies  in  the  field. 

The  dispersion  of  the  Union  forces  in  his  front 
did  not  pass  unnoticed  by  Bragg,  who  soon  con- 
ceived and  put  into  execution  one  of  the  boldest 
plans  of  campaign  of  the  war.  Early  in  June  he 
began  the  shifting  of  his  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
to  Chattanooga,  where,  in  conjunction  with  Kirby 
Smith, — commanding  a  Confederate  Army  in  East 


1 6  STONE'S   RIVER 

Tennessee, — he  perfected  his  scheme  of  operation. 
The  prelude  of  his  campaign  was  exhibited  in  the 
form  of  extensive  raids  by  Forrest's  Cavalry  and 
Morgan's,  in  which  the  Federal  lines  of  communi- 
cation were  repeatedly  cut,  huge  stores  of  supplies 
taken  or  destroyed,  and  several  important  posts 
captured.  Early  in  August  the  heavy  columns  of 
Confederate  infantry  and  artillery  began  pouring 
through  the  mountain  passes  into  the  coveted  terri- 
tory of  Kentucky. 

Bragg's  invasion  of  Kentucky  was  thus  prac- 
tically simultaneous  with  Lee's  invasion  of  Mary- 
land; and  the  two  movements  caused  the  direst 
foreboding  and  dismay  in  the  North.  The  war 
was  coming  very  close  to  the  people  of  that  section 
when  Confederate  detachments  appeared  in  the 
rear  of  Covington,  in  sight  of  Cincinnati,  and 
when  the  chief  Confederate  Army  crossed  the  Po- 
tomac into  the  Maryland  that  the  Southern  poets 
had  already  immortalized  in  song.  Not  the  least 
of  the  objects  of  these  two  campaigns  was  the  win- 
ning to  the  Confederate  cause  of  the  States  in- 
vaded. 

Nelson,  with  a  small  Union  force,  was  badly 
beaten  by  Kirby  Smith  at  Richmond,  Ky.,  August 
23,  and  Louisville  experienced  the  agonies  of  a 
panic,  for  it  was  practically  defenseless.  Buell 
had  been  so  mystified  by  Bragg's  movements  that 
he  did  not  start  in  pursuit  until  September  7,  and 
even  then  might  not  have  reached  Louisville  in 


STONE'S   RIVER  17 

time,  had  not  the  Confederate  forces  lost  precious 
hours  in  taking  Munfordville.  But  having  reached 
that  city,  Buell  held  the  key  to  the  situation,  and 
Bragg  was  forced  to  retire, — which  he  did  slowly 
and  carefully.  At  Perryville  a  portion  of  Buell's 
army  and  some  of  Bragg's  troops  met  on  October 
8  in  a  fierce  battle, — an  engagement  that  will  al- 
ways be  a  source  of  mystery  to  students,  in  that 
neither  side  took  advantage  of  obvious  opportuni- 
ties. Bragg,  in  this  campaign,  failed  of  a  major 
object,  which  was  to  rouse  Kentucky  for  the  Con- 
federacy, though  he  went  through  the  form  of 
inaugurating  a  Provisional  Governor  at  the  State 
capital,  Frankfort;  but  he  did  return  South  with 
long  trains  of  fine  horses  and  beeves,  with  wagons 
richly  laden  with  food  and  clothing,  and  with  al- 
most enough  recruits  to  offset  the  human  wastage 
of  his  army  on  march  and  in  battle.  Moreover, 
at  the  close  of  the  campaign  he  was  in  the  posses- 
sion of  some  territory  heretofore  held  by  Federal 
forces, — territory  that  was  not  yielded  up  until 
almost  a  year  later. 

The  disorganization  in  and  near  Washington, — 
consequent  upon  Pope's  defeat, — gave  Lee  an  ad- 
vantage which  he  improved  by  celerity  of  move- 
ment; and  he  was  well  into  Maryland  before  a 
Union  army  was  got  together  to  oppose  him.  The 
command  of  this  army  was  entrusted  to  McClel- 
lan,  who  exercised  his  customary  super-caution,  one 
result  of  which  was  that  Harper's  Ferry,  with 


1 8  STONE'S   RIVER 

thousands  of  prisoners  and  great  stores  of  military 
supplies,  fell, — with  scarce  a  struggle, — into 
Lee's  hands.  This  very  success  might  have  been 
fatal  to  Lee, — for  he  had  scattered  his  army  to 
accomplish  this  and  other  objects, — but  McClel- 
lan,  though  fully  aware  of  the  situation,  moved 
too  slowly,  and  the  Southern  general  had  time  to 
concentrate  on  the  banks  of  Antietam  Creek. 
Here,  on  September  17,  was  fought  one  of  the 
bloodiest  battles  of  the  war, — a  battle  in  which 
the  Confederate  Army  stood  off  a  foe  twice  as 
strong  in  numbers,  and  at  length  retired  at  leisure, 
without  further  molestation.  Like  Bragg,  Lee  had 
failed  to  win  the  State  that  he  had  invaded,  but 
though  he  had  suffered  tremendous  losses,  he  had 
accomplished  some  important  results. 

The  people  of  the  North,  it  may  be  remarked 
without  disparagement,  were  better  informed  as 
to  the  events  of  the  war  than  were  the  people  of 
the  South.  Their  more  thickly  settled  territory  was 
abundantly  supplied  with  telegraph  lines  and  rail- 
ways, and  their  numerous  populous  cities  boasted 
many  strong  newspapers.  Of  these,  not  a  few 
were  hostile  to  the  administration,  which  also  had 
to  contend  with  a  well-organized  opposing  political 
party.  To  many  persons  in  the  North  the  cam- 
paigns of  Lee  and  Bragg  seemed  conclusive  proof 
that  the  Confederacy,  after  almost  two  years  of 
fighting,  was  not  only  not  weaker,  but  could  at 


STONE'S   RIVER  19 

will  practically  carry  the  war  into  Northern  terri- 
tory. 

Lincoln,  accepting  the  check  at  Antietam  as  a 
victory,  had  (September  22)  issued  his  prelim- 
inary Emancipation  Proclamation,  but  the  first 
effect  of  this  was  probably  adverse,  for  the  fall 
elections  went  almost  uniformly  against  the  Presi- 
dent's party.  The  Nation's  credit  fell  to  a  low 
ebb,  and  offerings  of  Government  bonds  found 
few  takers,  only  $25,000,000  worth  being  sold 
during  the  year.  Gold  mounted  to  high  and  higher 
premiums,  and  general  business, — despite  the  ar- 
tificial stimulus  incident  to  the  production  of  war 
materials, — was  dishearteningly  poor. 

Buell,  because  of  his  failure  to  do  more  against 
Bragg,  was  relieved  of  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  which  fell  to  Rosecrans,  »vho 
had  achieved  success  at  Corinth,  during  the  fall. 
McClellan,  because  of  his  failure  to  follow  Lee 
after  Antietam,  was  ordered  to  turn  over  the  Com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  Burnside. 
As  the  end  of  the  year  drew  nigh,  Rosecrans  was 
established  with  his  army  at  Nashville,  and  Bragg 
was  at  Murfreesboro,  30  miles  south.  The  events 
of  that  season  were  well  calculated  to  enthuse  the 
Confederate  and  to  depress  the  Federal  force.  On 
December  13  was  fought  the  Battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg,  where  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  re- 
pulsed, with  frightful  slaughter,  by  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  under  Lee.  A  week  later,  the 


20  STONE'S   RIVER 

immense  depot  of  supplies  at  Holly  Springs, — sup- 
plies that  Grant  had  gathered  to  aid  him  in  his 
campaign  against  Vicksburg, — was  captured.  On 
December  29,  Sherman,  in  a  preliminary  move- 
ment of  this  campaign,  was  hurled  back,  stunned 
and  bleeding,  from  an  assault  upon  Chickasaw 
Bluffs. 

Two  days  later  was  to  open  the  pivotal  battle  in 
Middle  Tennessee. 


CHAPTER  II 

FOREIGN  RELATIONS  IN  1862 

The  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  the  North 
and  the  South  was  greeted  with  obvious  delight 
by  the  majority  of  public  journals,  and  with  thinly 
veiled  satisfaction  by  many  of  the  public  officials 
of  the  more  important  nations  of  Europe.  Russia, 
indeed,  showed  a  substantial  and  potent  friendship 
for  the  United  States,  and  Italy, — where  the  move- 
ment for  liberal  institutions  had  already  won  im- 
portant victories, — evinced  a  sympathy  both  gen- 
eral and  genuine.  But  these  were  the  exceptions. 
In  Austria  and  the  German  States  the  hostile  feel- 
ing for  the  American  Republic  had  little  effect  at 
the  time.  The  attitude  of  France  and  Great 
Britain  was  vastly  more  hurtful. 

Napoleon  III  was  then  at  the  very  height  of  his 
power,  and  his  bizarre  performances  and  dreams 
of  conquest  had  dazzled  the  imagination  of  his 
countrymen  to  an  extent  that  it  is  difficult  to  realize 
at  this  day.  Nay,  more, — he  had  cast  such  a  spell 
over  the  minds  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  min- 
isters as  to  have  led  to  a  practical  allience  upon  cer- 
tain important  subjects.  The  French  Emperor 

21 


22  STONE'S   RIVER 

saw  in  the  disruption  of  the  United  States  a  vindi- 
cation of  his  own  usurpation  and  an  opportunity  to 
plant  an  Imperial  Government  under  his  own 
guidance  in  Mexico.  In  addition,  the  shortage  of 
cotton,  due  to  the  blockade  of  Southern  ports,  was 
causing  very  serious  distress  in  the  textile  districts 
of  France;  so  there  was  perhaps  one  real  reason 
for  the  Emperor  to  show  some  concern  in  trans- 
Atlantic  affairs,  and  repeatedly  to  proffer  his  un- 
friendly "friendly  offices."  However  that  may  be, 
his  suggestion  of  mediation  and  intervention  did 
not  fall  upon  deaf  ears  across  the  Channel,  though, 
with  characteristic  caution,  the  British  Govern- 
ment deferred  action  until  its  opportunity  had 
passed. 

French  ill-opinion  could  have  been  borne, — even 
if  it  had  taken  the  form  of  countenancing  con- 
tracts for  Confederate  ships-of-war  and  winking 
at  aid  and  comfort  given  to  the  cruisers  of  that 
unrecognized  power.  But  British  unfriendliness 
took  a  form  that,  short  of  actual  war,  could 
scarcely  have  done  more  to  harm  and  exasperate 
the  government  and  people  of  the  United  States. 
The  recognition  of  the  belligerency  of  the  Con- 
federates,—  which  (candor  compels  the  state- 
ment) had  much  in  logic  and  reason  to  justify  it, 
larity — was  but  the  least  of  the  offendings. 

In  plain  defiance  of  international  law,  splendid 
vessels  were  built  in  British  yards  for  the  purpose 
however  it  may  have  savored  of  technical  irregu- 


STONE'S   RIVER  23 

of  sweeping  the  commerce  of  the  United  States 
from  the  seas;  Confederate  rifles  and  cannon  were 
readily  procured  from  British  dealers;  Confeder- 
ate loans  were  floated  by  British  bankers,  and  over- 
subscribed by  the  British  public;  the  sale  of  shares 
in  British  blockade-runners  to  Confederate  ports 
was  an  easy  matter,  as  it  appealed  not  only  to  the 
cupidity  but  to  the  prejudice  of  the  purchaser.  All 
grades  of  publications, — from  the  newspapers  to 
the  stately  reviews, — teemed  with  abuse  of  Ameri- 
cans,— abuse  written  in  almost  inconceivable  fero- 
city and  malice.  The  humorous  organ,  Punch,  did 
not  check  its  "scurrile  jester"  in-  the  drawing  of 
most  offensive  cartoons  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States;  practically  the  whole  of  the  aris- 
tocracy was  hostile;  in  all  Parliament  but  one 
voice  was  raised  for  the  North,  and  that  was  the 
voice  of  John  Bright. 

While  the  rancor  and  venom  were  expended 
upon  the  North,  and  while  that  section  suffered 
solely  from  the  violations  of  international  law, 
it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  British  press,  pa- 
tricians, and  politicians  were  actuated  by  any  gen- 
uine motives  of  good  will  to  the  South.  Their  hope 
and  prayer  were  for  the  disruption  and  destruc- 
tion of  the  Republic,  in  which  the  nobility  recog- 
nized their  most  powerful, — however  passive, — 
enemy;  and  the  trading  classes  thought  they  saw 
the  ruin  of  their  commercial  rival.  There  was, 
however,  one  great  element  in  England  that  was 


24  STONE'S   RIVER 

stanchly  on  the  side  of  the  North  throughout  the 
whole  conflict;  and  though  it  did  not  possess  the 
franchise,  this  element  was  not  without  its  influ- 
ence. The  working  classes  of  the  kingdom  were 
able  to  penetrate  the  mists  that  blinded  their  su- 
periors in  station,  and  they  saw  from  the  beginning 
that,  whatever  the  ostensible  purpose,  the  actual 
result  of  Northern  triumph  would  be  the  end  of 
slavery.  It  is  at  once  a  pathetic  and  magnificent 
fact,  that  no  amount  of  specious  argument,  such 
as  was  frequently  addressed  to  him,  that  no  reflec- 
tion upon  his  own  sufferings,  could  win  the  Lan- 
cashire cottonspinner, — starving,  because  of  the 
shortage  in  the  great  staple  of  his  industry, — 
from  the  cause  of  human  freedom. 

It  is,  perhaps,  too  much  to  say  that  the  British 
Ministry  had  always  inclined  to  a  recognition  of 
the  Confederacy.  But  as  the  war  progressed  and 
its  desperate  and  extensive  character  began  to  be 
revealed,  the  project  of  some  action  tending  to 
this  end  was  frequently  discussed  in  Downing 
Street.  The  British  premier  at  this  time  was  Lord 
Palmerston,  and  next  in  rank  to  him  in  the  Cabinet 
was  Lord  John  Russell,  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs.  Practised  and  polished  poli- 
ticians both,  they  had  been  able  to  adjust  their 
ambitions  and  predilections  in  this  instance  to  mu- 
tual satisfaction.  But  a  third  member  of  the  Min- 
istry, the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  gave  them 
both  great  concern.  William  Ewart  Gladstone, — 


STONE'S   RIVER  25 

whose  genius  was  then  being  revealed  in  full  pro- 
portion to  the  English  public, — was  too  able,  too 
popular,  and,  above  all,  too  formidable  to  be  left 
out  of  the  Coalition  Cabinet.  But  it  is  well  es- 
tablished that  he  was  regarded  with  personal  dis- 
like and  with  professional  jealousy  by  his  veteran 
colleagues.  This  feeling  of  animosity  was  to  lead 
to  a  most  singular  consequence, — one  that  had 
a  grave  bearing  on  American  affairs. 

The  stopping  by  a  United  States  warship  of  the 
Royal  Mail  Steamer  Trent  in  November,  1861, 
and  the  removal  therefrom  of  the  Confederate 
envoys,  Mason  and  Slidell,  brought  the  two  coun- 
tries to  the  brink  of  war.  Only  the  prompt,  com- 
plete, and  skillful  disavowal  of  the  American  Gov- 
ernment served  to  avert  hostilities,  preparations 
for  which  had  already  begun  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain.  The  temper  and  disposition  of  Her 
Majesty's  Ministry  were  plainly  shown  in  the  tru- 
culent tone  of  the  demand  framed  by  Russell, — a 
paper  that  was  adopted  by  the  Cabinet,  though 
Gladstone  suggested  some  modifications.  How- 
ever, it  would  have  been  sent  as  written,  had  not 
the  Queen,  acting  on  the  advice  of  the  Prince  Con- 
sort, insisted  upon  a  modification  of  some  of  fhe 
more  offensive  phrases.  Had  it  not  been  for  this 
kindly  and  sagacious  interposition  of  Queen  Vic- 
toria, the  situation  might  have  gone  beyond  the 
power  of  the  Lincoln  Government  to  control. 

The  smothering  of  the   Trent  incident  in  the 


26  STONE'S   RIVER 

honey  of  diplomacy  left  the  Ministry  without  an 
immediate  and  direct  pretext  for  unfriendly  ac- 
tion, but  there  remained  a  feeling  of  irritation  and 
a  tacit  determination  to  do  something  when  a 
proper  opportunity  should  occur. 

The  Confederate  successes  in  the  summer  of 
1862  were  convincing  proofs  to  the  British  mind 
that  the  independence  of  the  South  was  only  a  mat- 
ter of  time,  and  discussions  of  the  subject  were 
frequent  at  the  Cabinet  meetings.  Those  were 
anxious  times  for  the  American  Minister,  Charles 
Francis  Adams,  whose  personal  luggage  was  kept 
packed  in  anticipation  of  a  sudden  breach  of  diplo- 
matic relations  which  would  necessitate  his  de- 
parture from  the  Court  of  St.  James. 

Near  the  close  of  the  summer,  Gladstone  wrote 
to  his  wife:  "Lord  Palmerston  has  come  exactly 
to  my  mind  about  some  early  representations  of 
a  friendly  kind  to  America,  if  we  can  get  France 
and  Russia  to  join."  At  about  the  same  time  he 
wrote  to  another  correspondent:  '"My  opinion  is 
that  it  is  vain,  and  wholly  unsustained  by  prece- 
dent, to  say  that  nothing  shall  be  done  until  parties 
are  desirous  of  it,"  and  went  on  to  repeat  the 
former  suggestion. 

About  two  months  later  Palmerston  wrote  to 
Gladstone  saying  that  he  and  Russell  were  agreed 
that  an  offer  of  mediation  should  be  made  by 
Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  and  that  the  Ambas- 
sador at  Paris  was  to  be  instructed  to  communicate 


STONE'S   RIVER  27 

with  the  French  Government  on  the  subject.  "Of 
course,"  he  added,  "no  actual  step  would  be  taken 
without  the  sanction  of  the  Cabinet." 

Lord  Russell  had  but  a  few  days  previously 
written  a  letter  to  Palmerston,  which  had  been 
shown  to  Gladstone,  in  which  he  said:  "I  agree 
with  you  that  the  time  is  come  for  offering  media- 
tion to  the  United  States  government  with  a  view 
to  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Con- 
federates. I  agree  further  that,  in  case  of  failure, 
we  ought  ourselves  to  recognize  the  Confederate 
States  as  an  independent  State." 

With  the  words  of  these  two  letters  singing  in 
his  mind  and  mingling  with  the  mental  harmonies 
he  himself  had  conceived,  Mr.  Gladstone  went  to 
Newcastle  to  partake  of  a  banquet  prepared  for 
him  by  party  admirers,  and  to  utter  on  October 
7,  1862,  in  the  course  of  a  general  speech,  a  com- 
ment upon  American  affairs  that  was  to  vex  him 
to  the  end  of  his  life.  Said  he  : 

"We  know  quite  well  that  the  people  of  the  North  have  not 
yet  drunk  of  the  cup,— they  are  still  trying  to  hold  it  far  from 
their  lips, — which,  all  the  rest  of  the  world  see,  they,  never- 
theless, must  drink  of.  We  may  have  our  own  opinions  about 
slavery;  we  may  be  for  or  against  the  South;  but  there  is  no 
doubt  that  Jefferson  Davis  and  other  leaders  of  the  South 
have  made  an  army ;  they  are  making,  it  appears,  a  navy ;  and 
they  have  made, — what  is  more  than  either, — they  have  made  a 
nation.  We  may  anticipate  with  certainty  the  success  of  the 
Southern  States,  so  far  as  their  separation  from  the  North  is 
concerned." 

It  is  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  profound  sensa- 
tion that  this  passage  in  Gladstone's  speech  made 


28  STONE'S   RIVER 

in  the  United  Kingdom,  on  the  Continent,  and 
in  the  United  States.  There  was  no  escaping  its 
significance.  It  meant  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  on  the  point  of  recognizing  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  South,  and  such  an  act  must  have 
led  to  war  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  Aware  of  the  sentiment  that  pervaded  the 
Cabinet,  Minister  Adams  had  sought  explicit  in- 
structions from  the  United  States  State  Depart- 
ment, which  instructions  had  come  in  unequivocal 
terms  in  a  letter  from  Secretary  Seward.  Mr. 
Seward  wrote: 

"If  contrary  to  our  expectations,  the  British  Government, 
either  alone  or  in  combination  with  any  other  Government, 
should  acknowledge  the  insurgents,  while  you  are  remaining 
without  further  instructions  from  this  Government  concern- 
ing that  event,  you  will  immediately  suspend  the  exercise  of 
your  functions.  ...  I  have  now,  in  behalf  of  the  United 
States,  and  by  the  authority  of  their  Chief  Executive  Magis- 
trate, performed  an  important  duty.  Its  possible  consequences 
have  been  weighed  and  its  solemnity  is  therefore  felt  and 
freely  acknowledged.  This  duty  has  brought  us  to  meet  and 
confront  the  danger  of  a  war  with  Great  Britain  and  other 
States  allied  with  the  insurgents  who  are  in  arms  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  American  Union.  You  will  perceive  that 
we  have  approached  the  contemplation  of  that  crisis  with 
the  caution  that  great  reluctance  has  inspired.  But  I  trust 
that  you  will  also  have  perceived  that  the  crisis  has  not  ap- 
palled us." 

Mr.  Adams  must  have  perused  this  letter  many 
times  as  he  waited  for  the  meeting  of  the  British 
Ministry, — which  he  learned  had  been  called  for 
October  23, — to  act  upon  the  question  of  the  Civil 
War  in  America.  Indeed,  he  had  felt  a  strong 
impulse  to  call  for  his  passports  immediately  after 


STONE'S   RIVER  29 

the  Gladstone  speech  at  Newcastle,  but  had  con- 
cluded to  wait  a  few  days  for  formal  action  by 
the  government  to  which  he  was  accredited. 

But  now  conditions  and  cirnmstances  beyond 
the  ken  of  diplomacy  had  conspired  to  put  the  in- 
evitable moment  indefinitely  forward.  Whether, 
as  has  been  suggested,  Gladstone,  in  his  Newcastle 
speech,  had  intended  to  force  his  colleagues  into 
a  position  the  only  outlet  of  which  was  recogni- 
tion, or  whether  knowing  their  sentiments  he  had  in 
mere  exuberance  let  the  cat  out  of  the  bag,  he  had 
committed  a  grave  breach  of  official  etiquette  in 
thus  speaking  without  express  Cabinet  sanction. 
It  was  a  false  move,  upon  which  Palmerston  and 
Russell  seized  with  eagerness  and, — it  may  be 
imagined, — private  glee.  Within  a  week  Sir 
George  Cornewall  Lewis,  a  member  of  the  Cab- 
inet, made,  at  Palmerston's  express  direction,  a 
public  speech  in  which  he  adroitly  gave  the  lie  to 
Gladstone.  The  fateful  Cabinet  meeting  of  the 
23rd  was  postponed,  and  a  new  proposal  of  Na- 
poleon III  that  came  at  about  this  time, — a  pro- 
posal looking  to  joint  mediation  or  intervention, — 
was  rejected,  on  the  ground  that  the  time  was  not 
yet  ripe. 

The  British  Ministry  kept  looking  for  the  au- 
spicious opportunity  for  several  months  there- 
after. Many  thought  it  had  come  in  the  middle 
of  December,  when  the  Fredericksburg  disaster 
was  described  by  the  London  Times  correspondent 


3o  STONE'S   RIVER 

as  "a  memorable  day  to  the  historian  of  the  De- 
cline and  Fall  of  the  American  Republic."  But 
on  the  last  day  of  the  year  was  begun  the  battle 
that  was  to  show  the  British  public, — what  was 
sometimes  forgotten, — that  there  were  armies  out- 
side of  Virginia  and  territories  beyond  the  Alle- 
ghanies.  Out  of  the  mists  which  surrounded 
Stone's  River, — out  of  the  uncertainty  due  to  coun- 
ter-claims of  victory  by  the  rival  commanders, — 
arose  this  definite  fact :  The  Northern  Army  had 
occupied  the  town  that  it  set  out  to  take,  and  the 
Southern  Army  had  retired  almost  to  the  borders 
of  Tennessee  and  could  not  dispute  the  claim  of 
its  enemy  to  the  greater  part  of  the  area  of  that 
Commonwealth.  Another  postponement  seemed 
necessary.  By  this  time  also  the  leaven  of  Lin- 
coln's Emancipation  Proclamation,  which  at  first 
had  been  derided,  was  working  in  England;  and, 
in  their  turn  and  time,  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg 
aided  to  produce  a  much-changed  official  atmo- 
sphere. The  Foreign  Minister  who,  against  the 
law  of  the  Kingdom,  had  let  the  Alabama  and  the 
Florida  slip  away  to  prey  upon  American  com- 
merce, was  to  strain  that  law  a  few  months  later 
to  hold  war-vessels  that  had  been  built  for  the 
South. 

The  danger  to  the  Union  from  foreign  sources 
had  passed. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ARMIES  AND  THEIR  LEADERS 

The  armies  that  were  soon  to  measure  strength 
in  Middle  Tennessee  were  not  strangers.  They 
had  raced  with  each  other  to  the  banks  of  the 
Ohio  in  the  previous  fall,  they  had  confronted 
each  other, — at  times, — in  fractional  strength 
upon  a  score  of  fields.  It  was  the  advance  division 
of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  which  had  checked  the 
Confederate  onset  on  the  first  day  at  Shiloh,  where 
Grant  was  all  but  overwhelmed,  and  that  com- 
mand, in  full  strength,  had  done  its  share  in 
driving  the  gray-clad  battalions  from  the  field  the 
next  day.  The  guarding  of  Middle  Tennessee  and 
the  taking  of  East  Tennessee  had  since  then  been 
its  special  charge  and  designed  function,  and  in 
token  thereof  it  had  been  named  anew  "the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,"  after  the  river  that  traverses 
those  regions.  The  army  was  composed  princi- 
pally of  soldiers  from  the  old  Northwest  Terri- 
tory,— a  region  dedicated  to  human  freedom  in 
the  ordinance  of  1787.  But  while  Ohio,  Indiana, 
Illinois,  Michigan,  and  Wisconsin  furnished  the 
bulk  of  the  troops,  there  were  also  regiments  from 

31 


32  STONE'S   RIVER 

Kentucky  and  several  composed  of  East  Tennessee 
Unionists.  Pennsylvania  had  sent  a  contingent, 
and  Missouri  and  Kansas  were  both  represented. 
From  the  regular  army  of  the  United  States,  there 
were  a  formidable  force  of  artillery,  a  few  troops 
of  cavalry,  and  a  particularly  fine  brigade  of  in- 
fantry. 

The  Confederate  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was 
composed  largely  of  sons  of  the  Commonwealth 
from  which  it  derived  its  name,  but  almost  every 
other  State  in  the  Confederacy  was  represented. 
A  picturesque  and  romantic  element  was  the 
famous  "Orphan  Brigade"  composed  of  Kentuck- 
ians  who  fought  for  the  South  while  their  State 
adhered  to  the  North,  and  who  attested  their 
heroism  on  many  occasions  during  the  war.  The 
two  armies  were  substantially  equal  in  strength,  for 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  reported  an  available 
present  of  43,400  men,  while  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  which  had  the  advantage  of  position, 
showed  37,700  ready  for  battle.  The  Southern 
Army  was  greatly  superior  in  cavalry,  for  this 
arm  of  the  service  had  not,  as  yet,  received  in  the 
North  the  attention  it  warranted.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Northern  Army  was  greatly  superior 
in  artillery.  While  the  bulk  of  both  armies  was 
made  up  of  veteran  troops,  each  had  considerable 
percentages  of  raw  levies. 

Gen.  Braxton  Bragg  had  the  advantage, — 
somewhat  doubtful  in  his  case, — of  long  service 


STONE'S   RIVER  33 

with  his  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  He  was  a 
splendid  organizer  and  disciplinarian,  thoroughly 
versed  in  the  technique  of  his  profession,  brave, 
honorable,  devoted  to  his  cause,  and  a  strategist 
of  no  mean  order.  But  he  united  a  high,  imperi- 
ous temper  and  a  saturnine  disposition  with  a 
martinet's  passion  for  the  letter  of  military  regu- 
lation and  etiquette.  As  a  consequence,  he  was 
frequently  embroiled  with  those  near  him  in 
stations  of  authority, — officers  who  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  accuse  him  of  finding  convenient  scape- 
goats for  his  own  errors.  His  controversies  with 
those  under  him  form  an  interesting  chapter  of 
Confederate  records.  It  is  but  just  to  him  to 
add  that  there  were  those  that  fought  under 
him  who  testified  to  warm  admiration  for  his 
soldierly  abilities  and  who  entertained  high  per- 
sonal esteem  for  his  qualities  as  a  man. 

Bragg's  army  was  divided  into  two  corps.  One 
of  these  corps  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant- 
General  William  J.  Hardee,  who  had  won  a 
conspicuous  position  in  the  Army  of  the  United 
States  before  he  had  come  to  offer  his  sword  and 
talents  to  the  Confederacy.  He  was  the  author 
of  a  book  of  tactics  employed  in  the  United 
States  Army  long  after  the  Civil  War, — a  sys- 
tem said  to  have  been  founded  on  the  drill  regu- 
lations devised  by  Napoleon.  The  other  corps 
was  commanded  by  Lieut.-Gen,  Leonidas  Polk, 
who  was  Bragg's  pet  aversion,  and  who  spent 


34  STONE'S   RIVER 

much  of  the  next  twelve  months  in  writing  to 
Richmond  about  his  superior  and  extricating  him- 
self from  the  latter's  orders  of  arrest. 

General  Polk  had  been  educated  at  West  Point, 
but  had  afterward  entered  the  Episcopal  Min- 
istry. When  the  war  broke  out  he  was  Bishop 
of  Louisiana;  but  he  speedily  exchanged  the  sur- 
plice for  the  uniform,  and  attained  high  rank  in 
the  Southern  Army.  He  was  a  man  of  consid- 
erable warlike  talent,  though  perhaps  short  of 
first-grade. 

One  of  Bragg's  division  commanders  was 
Major-General  John  C.  Breckinridge,  of  Ken- 
tucky, who,  as  Vice-President  of  the  United 
States,  had  declared  the  count  of  the  electoral 
vote  whereby  Lincoln  was  chosen  President,  and 
who  had  left  his  seat  in  the  United  States  Senate, 
— months  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,- — to 
cast  his  fortunes  with  the  South.  Afterward, 
as  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  he  accompanied 
Jefferson  Davis  on  his  flight  from  Richmond,  and 
assisted  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  arranging  the 
terms  for  the  surrender  of  the  latter's  army  to 
William  T.  Sherman, — terms  that  were  repudi- 
ated by  the  Washington  authorities. 

Other  notable  figures  in  Bragg's  army  were  the 
impetuous  Gen.  "Pat"  Cleburne,  who  was  to  lose 
his  life  in  the  wild  charge  on  the  fortifications  of 
Franklin  two  years  later;  Gen.  John  H.  Morgan, 
the  Kentucky  partisan  raider,  and  Gen.  Joseph 


STONE'S   RIVER  35 

Wheeler,  the  cavalry  leader,  who  had  so  managed 
the  rear-guard  in  the  retreat  from  Kentucky  as 
to  preserve  intact  the  rich  booty  of  the  "Blue 
Grass"  region  borne  by  the  retiring  Confederates. 
Wheeler  was  one  of  the  Southern  generals  who 
later  saw  service  under  the  "old  flag"  in  the 
Spanish-American  war,  commanding  a  division  in 
Shaffer's  Army  before  Santiago. 

Maj.-Gen.  William  S.  Rosecrans  was  one  of 
the  contradictions  of  the  war.  A  graduate  of 
West  Point,  he  had  resigned  from  the  army  and 
was  practising  his  profession  of  engineering, 
when  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  called  him  to 
arms  again.  He  had  achieved  considerable  suc- 
cess in  1 86 1,  when,  having  taken  up  a  work  left 
unfinished  by  McClellan,  he  cleared  the  Confed- 
erates out  of  West  Virginia,  thereby  placing  in 
temporary  eclipse  the  military  reputation  of 
Robert  E.  Lee.  His  assignment  to  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  chiefly  due 
to  his  defense  of  Corinth  during  the  fall,  though 
he  was  criticised  by  Grant, — then  his  immediate 
superior, — for  not  having  achieved  greater  re- 
sults in  this  engagement.  As  a  strategist  Rose- 
crans was  of  the  first  order ;  indeed,  one  of  his  cam- 
paigns still  stands  as  a  model  for  the  study  of  pro- 
fessional soldiers.  But  brave,  warm-hearted,  and 
impulsive,  he  was  prone  to  lose  his  poise  in  battle, 
as  the  melancholy  outcome  of  Chickamauga  was 
later  to  prove. 


36  STONE'S   RIVER 

Rosecrans  had  divided  his  army  into  right  wing, 
centre  and  left  wing, — for  convenience  designated 
as  corps.  The  centre  was  commanded  by  Maj.- 
Gen.  George  H.  Thomas,  the  idol  of  the  army,  and 
probably  the  most  complete  soldier  that  the  Union 
produced.  It  was  said  of  him  that  he  never  made 
a  mistake.  At  Mill  Springs  he  had  given  the 
Union  cause  its  first  generous  beam  of  hope  by 
his  crushing  defeat  of  Zollicoffer.  In  the  recent 
campaign  in  Kentucky  it  was  his  soldierly  instinct 
that  had  penetrated  the  plans  of  the  enemy;  his 
counsel,  which  followed,  led  to  success, — which 
disregarded,  led  to  failure.  It  was  he  who  below 
Chattanooga  was  to  gather  around  him  the  frag- 
ments of  a  broken  army,  the  commander  of  which 
had  fled  the  field,  and  fighting  on,  was  to  win 
lasting  fame  as  the  "Rock  of  Chickamauga."  It 
was  he  who,  at  Nashville, — waiting  amid  a 
storm  of  criticism,  abuse,  and  threats  from  those 
higher  in  authority, — sallied  forth,  when  all  was 
ready,  to  win  the  most  complete  victory  of  the 
four  years'  struggle. 

The  right  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land was  under  command  of  Maj.-Gen.  Alexander 
McDowell  McCook,  a  native  of  Ohio,  and  one  of 
the  "Fighting  McCooks,"  so-called,  because  so 
many  of  his  family  fought  for  the  Union.  The 
left  wing  was  commanded  by  Maj.-Gen.  Thomas 
L.  Crittenden,  scion  of  a  noted  Kentucky  family, 
which,  with  great  liberality  and  rare  impartiality, 


STONE'S   RIVER  37 

contributed  stalwart  representatives  to  both  sides 
of  the  war.  Among  the  division  commanders  was 
Philip  H.  Sheridan,  who  later  was  to  defeat  Early 
in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and,  by  throwing 
his  columns  across  the  line  of  Lee's  retreat  from 
Richmond,  was  to  furnish  the  prelude  for  the 
final  scenes  of  the  war  drama  at  Appamatox. 

Nashville,  the  capital  of  Tennessee,  had,  after 
the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  been  occupied  as  a  secondary 
base  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  had 
been  heavily  fortified.  Distant  150  miles  from 
Louisville, — the  primary  base, — with  lines  of 
communication  frequently  interrupted  by  the 
ubiquitous  Morgan  and  other  Confederate  raid- 
ers, it  was  difficult  to  accumulate  sufficient  supplies 
for  a  campaigning  army;  but  by  December  ample 
stores  were  in  hand.  Murfreesboro,  where  the 
headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  had 
been  established,  was  an  important  military  and 
strategic  place  as  it  was  the  converging  point  of 
a  large  number  of  unusually  good  wagon-roads 
and  by  reason  of  its  location  on  the  Nashville 
and  Chattanooga  Railroad.  Its  facilities  gave 
it  dominance  over  a  wide  stretch  of  country,  rich 
in  supplies  and  recruits  for  the  Confederates,  and 
its  possession  was  the  first  requisite  in  that  move- 
ment for  the  relief  of  East  Tennessee  and  its 
harassed  Unionists, — a  movement  that  had  been 
so  constantly  urged  by  President  Lincoln  upon 
the  Federal  commanders  in  that  region. 


447965 


38  STONE'S   RIVER 

The  hearts  of  those  in  authority  in  the  Con- 
federate Government  never  beat  so  high  with 
hope  as  during  those  December  days  of  1862. 
Mr.  Davis  and  his  Cabinet,  as  they  surveyed  the 
situation,  might  well  have  felt  that  they  had  rea- 
son for  confidence.  The  principal  army  of  the 
Northern  foe  had  been  repeatedly  and  seriously 
defeated,  and  was  about  to  suffer  the  awful  reverse 
of  Fredericksburg.  In  Tennessee  and  Mississippi, 
— while  fortune  had  not  been  so  uniformly 
kindly, — there  were  all  the  facilities,  resources, 
and  spirit  for  successful  aggressive  work.  While 
much  ground  had  been  lost  in  the  Trans-Missis- 
sippi Department,  word  had  lately  come  that 
Hindman  had  succeeded  in  raising  a  fresh  army 
in  Arkansas, — a  force  that  was  expected  to  begin 
the  task  of  redeeming  that  State  and  recovering 
Missouri.  Pemberton  confronted  Grant  with 
temporarily  superior  forces  near  Vicksburg. 
Confederate  diplomatic  efforts  were  at  length 
promising  to  bear  fruit,  and  the  Alabama  and 
other  vessels  were  driving  Northern  commerce 
from  the  high  seas.  New  Orleans  had  fallen; 
but  Mobile,  Charleston,  Wilmington,  and  Savan- 
nah held  out,  to  offer  refuge  for  the  blockade 
runners,  which  brought  the  precious  military 
stores  into  the  South. 

It  was  under  the  spell  of  sentiment,  inspired  by 
such  conditions,  that  the  Confederate  President 
paid  a  visit  to  his  generals  and  their  forces  in 


STONE'S   RIVER  39 

Tennessee  and  Mississippi.  Bragg  felt  so  cer- 
tain of  himself  and  his  ground  that  he  readily  fell 
in  with  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Davis  to  detach 
some  10,000  troops  to  Pemberton,  though  Gen. 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
whole  department,  advised  against  this  course. 
The  presence  of  their  President  roused  the  en- 
thusiasm of  the  soldiers  at  Murfreesboro  to  a 
high  pitch,  and  many  official  and  social  ceremonies 
served  to  vary  the  festivities  planned  for  the 
Christmas  season.  There  were  balls,  receptions, 
theatrical  entertainments,  and  one  evening,  in  the 
presence  of  a  brilliant  throng,  General  Morgan 
took  unto  himself  a  wife, — the  ceremony  being 
performed  by  Bishop-General  Polk, — and  imme- 
diately left  for  Kentucky  on  another  of  the  raids 
that  did  so  much  to  harass,  impede,  and  annoy 
the  Union  armies. 

Rosecrans  had  learned  of  the  detachment  to 
Pemberton,  of  Morgan's  departure,  and  also  had 
been  informed  that  Wheeler  had  been  sent  on 
a  raid.  He  rightly  concluded  that  the  time  to 
strike  Bragg  was  when  the  Confederate  cavalry 
was  absent,  and  his  three  corps  set  out  from  Nash- 
ville on  separate  roads  the  day  after  Christmas. 
It  soon  developed  that,  if  Wheeler  had  been 
ordered  away,  he  had  been  recalled;  for 
his  troopers  gave  ample  notice  of  the  advance 
of  the  Union  Army,  and  Bragg  had  plenty 
of  opportunity  to  perfect  a  plan  of  resistance. 


40  STONE'S   RIVER 

Thomas  and  Crittenden,  however,  encountered 
little  difficulty  on  the  march.  McCook  found 
Hardee  in  his  path,  and  had  to  do  some  heavy 
skirmishing  before  he  got  up.  But  the  evening 
of  December  30  saw  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land in  position  about  three  miles  from  Mur- 
freesboro.  In  some  way  Rosecrans  got  the  im- 
pression that  Bragg  had  fallen  back,  and  gave 
orders  for  entering  the  town.  In  the  darkness 
some  of  Crittenden's  troops  began  a  movement, — 
a  movement  that  must  have  resulted  disastrously, 
if  pushed;  and  shots  had  already  been  exchanged 
with  the  Confederate  pickets,  when  the  mistake 
was  discovered  and  the  order  recalled.  Though 
it  had  rained  for  several  days,  and  though  the 
night  was  bitter  cold,  the  men  of  the  left  and 
centre  were  forbidden  to  light  fires, — even  for 
cooking, — lest  they  might  betray  their  where- 
abouts. But  fires  were  kindled  all  along  the 
front  of  McCook's  corps  and  far  to  the  right 
thereof;  for  Rosecrans  hoped  to  deceive  Bragg  as 
to  his  exact  position.  It  may  be  conjectured  that 
this  hope  was  illusive,  for  Bragg  had  exceedingly 
accurate  sources  of  information. 

Each  commander  decided  to  attack  on  the  mor- 
row. Rosecrans  planned  to  deliver  battle  from 
his  left  flank,  crumpling  up  the  right  of  his  enemy, 
and  taking  up  the  attack  with  his  centre  in  such 
a  way  as  to  enfilade  and  crush  Bragg's  entire 
army.  McCook  was  instructed  to  resist  strongly, 


STONE'S   RIVER  41 

but  not  to  attack,  except  by  way  of  diversion. 
The  position  taken  by  McCook's  corps  had 
given  Rosecrans  much  concern,  and  the  night  be- 
fore the  battle,  at  a  conference  with  his  principal 
officers,  he  had  made  several  suggestions  about 
it  to  the  Ohio  warrior.  In  conformity  with  the 
order  of  battle,  McCook's  right  was  strongly  re- 
fused,— that  is,  bent  back, — but,  in  general  it  was 
too  near  where  the  enemy  were  supposed  to  be  to 
suit  the  commanding  general.  McCook,  however, 
evinced  such  reluctance  about  giving  up  ground 
for  which  his  men  had  already  fought, — and 
which  presented  elements  of  natural  strength  that 
were  not  to  be  found  further  back, — that  the  mat- 
ter was  at  length  left  to  his  own  judgment.  He, 
therefore,  placed  the  bulk  of  his  corps  in  con- 
formity with  the  rest  of  the  army,  which  was 
aligned  upon  a  north-and-south  line,  threw  back 
the  right  brigades  of  Willich  and  Kirk, — of  John- 
son's division, — so  that  they,  with  their  artillery 
supports,  faced  almost  directly  south,  and  placed, 
as  a  reserve,  in  the  corner  thus  formed  Baldwin's 
brigade  of  the  same  division.  The  rest  of  the 
battle  front,  while  presenting  in  general  an 
eastern  face  on  a  north-and-south  line,  was  here 
advanced,  here  retired,  as  inequalities  of  ground 
or  patches  of  forest  seemed  to  offer  favorable 
position.  The  whole  Union  Army  was  west  of 
Stone's  River,  though  the  extreme  left  of  Crit- 
tenden's  left  wing  touched  that  stream  at  a  ford. 


42  STONE'S    RIVER 

Bragg' s  plan  of  battle  called  for  a  heavy  con- 
centration of  force  on  his  left  flank,  which  was 
to  take  the  initiative  in  an  attack  upon  the  Union 
right,  and  by  a  grand  wheel,  with  the  centre  as 
a  base,  would  take  the  invaders  in  flank  and  rear. 
Each  unit  was  to  take  up  the  movement  as  the 
battle  reached  it,  and  it  was  hoped  that  by  a  rapid, 
spirited,  and  sustained  attack  it  would  be  possible 
to  force  Rosecrans  back  of  the  Nashville  pike, — 
his  sole  line  of  supply  and  retreat, — and  hurling 
his  commands  one  upon  the  other,  accomplish 
the  capture  or  destruction  of  the  whole  Union 
Army.  In  furtherance  of  his  plan,  Bragg  placed 
almost  two-fifths  of  his  infantry  at  his  left  under 
Hardee,  to  whom  was  entrusted  the  initiation  of 
the  movement.  But  one  division  was  left,  under 
Breckenridge  on  the  right,  and  separated  from 
the  rest  of  the  army  by  the  river. 

The  Confederate  battle  front, — could  it  have 
been  viewed  in  its  entirety, — would  have  pre- 
sented a  much  more  symmetrical  appearance  than 
that  of  its  adversary;  as  the  comparatively  open 
and  level  country  that  it  momentarily  occupied 
permitted  a  more  orderly  alignment.  McCown's 
division  occupied  the  extreme  left, — except  for 
some  cavalry, — and  Cleburne's  heavy  columns 
were  massed  almost  immediately  in  the  rear. 

Thus,  it  will  be  observed,  the  rival  command- 
ers had,  with  practically  similar  conditions  to  en- 
counter, hit  upon  practically  similar  plans  of  bat- 


STONE'S   RIVER  43 

tie.  Could  each  plan  have  been  carried  out,  the 
two  armies  would  have  presented  the  appearance 
of  revolving  upon  a  common  axis,  the  right  in 
each  case  retiring  before  the  attack  of  the  enemy's 
left.  As  it  was,  however,  a  great  advantage, — as 
must  be  apparent, — was  to  attend  that  army 
which  should  first  strike  the  enemy  with  its  heavy 
masses  in  battle  array.  And  the  contingencies  of 
the  conflict  ordained  that  that  advantage  should 
be  gained  by  the  Confederates. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE 

Crittendon's  corps  on  the  left  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland, — which  had  been  selected  by 
Rosecrans  to  make  the  initial  move  in  the  fight, — 
was  separated  from  Breckenridge's  entrenched 
division,  on  Bragg's  right,  by  two  miles  of  dis- 
tance and  Stone's  River,  which  in  that  immediate 
vicinity  could  be  crossed  at  only  one  ford.  Be- 
tween the  heavily-massed  regiments  on  Bragg's 
left  flank  and  McCook's  corps,  to  the  contrary, 
there  were  only  a  few  hundred  yards.  There- 
fore, though  McCown, — who  had  moved  in  the 
night, — found  some  difficulty  in  adjusting  his  line 
to  suit  Hardee's  taste,  the  Confederates  had  am- 
ple time  to  strike  the  first  blow.  A  dense  fog 
shielded  the  movement  from  the  Union  pickets. 
McCown's  troops  swung  off  in  a  semi-oblique  di- 
rection, leaving  an  ever-widening  interval  between 
him  and  Withers's  division,  of  Folk's  corps,  into 
which  at  the  proper  instant  Cleburne  slipped.  In 
a  few  moments  the  crackling  of  rifle-fire  heralded 
the  opening  of  the  battle. 

44 


STONE'S   RIVER  45 

That  the  brigades  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
Union  Army  were  surprised  upon  that  fateful 
morning  has  been  repeatedly  denied;  but  it  is  cer- 
tain that  they  were  not  properly  prepared  for  the 
storm  that  was  about  to  burst  upon  them.  August 
Willich  was  actually  away  from  his  command, 
and  his  men  were  at  breakfast,  with  their  arms 
stacked.  The  captain  of  the  battery  that  was 
posted  at  the  left  of  the  brigade  had  sent  his 
horses  off  to  water,  so  little  did  he  dream  of  im- 
pending danger.  The  men  of  the  other  brigade 
were  scarcely, — if  any, — better  prepared,  and 
upon  them  fell  the  brunt  of  the  first  assault. 

Right  on  the  heels  of  the  pickets,  whose  shots 
were  of  little  apparent  effect,  appeared  a  long 
line  of  gray-clad  infantry  that  extended  far  be- 
yond either  flank  of  the  hapless  Union  brigades. 
The  advancing  troops  fired  as  they  came,  and 
many  Northern  soldiers  were  shot  down  before 
they  could  grasp  their  arms.  General  Kirk  sent  a 
vain  summons  to  Willich  for  aid,  and  fell  mor- 
tally hurt  in  an  heroic  effort  to  form  his  men. 
Old  Willich  himself,  spurring  in  hot  haste  to  re- 
join his  command,  rode  straight  into  the  enemy's 
line.  This  scion  of  a  royal  house, — for  he  was 
reputed  to  be  the  natural  son  of  William  of 
Prussia, — had  several  months  in  a  Southern 
prison  in  which  to  reflect  upon  whatever  error  he 
may  have  committed  that  morning.  The  two  bri- 
gades did  not  flee  without  an  effort  at  resistance ; 


46  STONE'S   RIVER 

indeed,  both  offered  obstinate  opposition  for  as 
long  a  time  as  possible,  but  they  could  not  hold 
out  against  two  divisions,  of  four  brigades  each. 

Kirk  lost  500  killed  and  wounded,  and  350  cap- 
tured; while  Willich's  loss  was  more  than  400 
killed  and  wounded,  and  about  700  captured. 
They  were  soon  in  headlong  flight. 

With  the  dispersion  of  these  troops,  but  one 
brigade,  of  Johnson's  division, — the  reserve  under 
Baldwin, — was  left  intact;  and  now  the  next  di- 
vision was  threatened  on  the  flank.  With  quick 
soldierly  instinct  the  commander,  Jefferson  C. 
Davis,  drew  back  his  right  brigade,  under  Post, 
and  made  other  dispositions  to  cooperate  with 
Baldwin.  He  had  scarcely  had  time  to  complete 
these  preparations,  ere  both  Baldwin  and  Post 
were  struck.  At  the  same  moment  the  Confeder- 
ate grand  wheel  having  got  into  full  swing,  two 
brigades  of  Withers's  division,  of  Polk's  corps, 
hurled  themselves  against  Davis's  two  remaining 
brigades, — Carlin's  and  Woodruff's, — and  against 
Sill's  brigade  of  Sheridan's  division,  adjoining 
Davis  on  the  left. 

Here  the  Confederates  met  a  check.  Baldwin, 
it  is  true,  had  to  retreat  shortly,  to  escape  being 
taken  in  right  and  rear;  but  Post  repulsed  an  at- 
tack upon  his  front,  and  Carlin,  Woodruff,  and 
Sill  threw  back  their  assailants  so  violently  that 
Polk  ordered  up  his  reserves.  A  second  attack 
met  the  same  fate,  though  General  Sill  was  killed 


STONE'S   RIVER  47 

between  the  guns  of  a  battery  that  he  was  direct- 
ing. For  the  third  time  the  gray  infantry  ad- 
vanced to  the  fight,  which  now  involved  the  whole 
of  Sheridan's  division.  In  frontal  attack  they 
were  held,  but  one  Union  command  after  another 
had  to  retire,  to  avoid  capture  under  flank  at- 
tacks. Thus  Sheridan's  division  was  dislodged,  as 
had  been  Johnson's  and  Davis's. 

Up  to  this  juncture  the  working  out  of  Bragg's 
plan  had  fully  equalled,  if  not  exceeded,  the  ex- 
pectations of  the  Southern  commander.  The 
whole  right  wing  of  the  Union  army  had  been 
hurled  from  position,  and  some  of  the  commands 
composing  it  had  been  driven  for  miles.  Thou- 
sands of  Union  prisoners  and  great  stores  of 
small  arms  had  been  captured,  together  with  many 
pieces  of  artillery,  which  could  not  be  hauled  back 
in  the  headlong  retreat  over  the  rough  ground  and 
through  the  clumps  of  cedar  in  which  the  battle- 
field abounded.  In  its  further  development,  or 
swing,  the  grand  wheel  was  now  threatening  the 
Union  centre,  and  the  exultant  Confederates  en- 
tered with  confidence  upon  another  distinct  stage 
of  the  fighting.  If  the  right  could  be  driven  still 
further,  or  the  centre  pierced,  the  Nashville  pike 
would  fall  into  the  possession  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  which  would  then  have;  at  its 
mercy  practically  the  whole  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland. But, — though  the  prize  seemed  so 
near, — it  now  became  evident  that  new  conditions 


48  STONE'S   RIVER 

were  to  be  encountered,  and  that  the  contest  was 
about  to  enter  upon  a  new  phase. 

Confident  in  the  belief  that  his  right  wing  could 
and  would  resist  any  movement  against  it,  Rose- 
crans  had  gone  early  in  the  morning  to  Critten- 
den's  corps,  to  witness  the  initiation  of  his  care- 
fully conceived  plan.  It  was  8  o'clock  before  the 
leading  brigade  of  Van  Cleve's  division  waded 
Stone's  River  at  the  near-by  ford,  and  began 
iclimbing  the  hill  on  the  other  side,  with  a  view  to 
attacking  Breckinridge.  For  a  couple  of  hours 
firing  had  been  heard  on  the  right,  but  it  gave  no 
uneasiness  to  the  Union  commander,  who  believed 
that  the  instructions  of  the  night  before  were  be- 
ing obeyed.  Even  when  a  message  from  McCook, 
asking  aid  in  somewhat  formal  terms,  came,  Rose- 
crans  was  not  disturbed,  but  sent  back  word  that 
the  right  must  be  held. 

It  was  not  until  two  of  Van  Cleve's  brigades 
had  crossed  the  stream,  and  the  third  was  making 
ready,  that  a  frantic  message  gave  Rosecrans  an 
idea  of  the  disaster  that  had  befallen  part  of  his 
army.  And  as  he  gave  hurried  orders,  the  crowds 
of  fugitives, — cowards,  skulkers,  the  slightly 
wounded,  and  brave  men  who  had  fought  until 
beaten, — that  began  to  stream  through  the  woods 
brought  confirmation  of  the  evil  tidings. 

Rosecrans  instantly  recalled  Van  Cleve's  di- 
vision. One  brigade, — Fyffe's, — that  had  not  yet 
crossed,  he  hurried  straight  out  on  the  Nashville 


STONE'S   RIVER  49 

pike,  where  his  instinct  told  him  the  greatest  dan- 
ger lay,  and  where  at  that  moment  the  enemy's 
cavalry  was  reaping  rich  spoil  from  the  long 
wagon  trains.  The  men  of  Beatty's  brigade  were 
sent,  dripping  with  the  water  of  Stone's  River, 
right  into  the  heart  of  the  battle,  which  now  raged 
almost  in  the  rear  of  the  centre.  The  third  bri- 
gade,— Price's, — was  held  to  guard  the  ford.  The 
demonstration  of  this  division  against  Brecken- 
ridge,  though  so  quickly  abandoned,  had  impor- 
tant effects  on  that  general  as  well  as  on  the  for- 
tunes of  the  day. 

It  was  the  supreme  test  for  Rosecrans,  and 
whatever  his  previous  faults  may  have  been,  he 
now  bore  himself  well.  He  hurried  up  ammuni- 
tion, which  was  much  needed  at  many  points;  di- 
rected the  formation  of  new  lines  and  the  posting 
of  fresh  batteries;  and  whenever  the  emergency 
permitted,  he  took  himself  to  the  battle  front, 
where  his  presence  served  to  reanimate  his  sorely- 
beset  soldiers.  In  spurring  from  one  part  of  the 
field  to  another,  his  aide-de-camp  and  much-loved 
companion,  Lieut.-Col.  Julius  P.  Garesche,  was 
beheaded  by  a  cannon  ball,  and  his  blood  sprinkled 
the  uniform  of  his  commander.  But  battles  give 
scant  time  for  mourning,  and  Rosecrans,  without- 
delay,  ordered  the  further  disintegration  of  Crit- 
tenden's  corps,  that  reinforcements  might  be  sent 
where  needed.  Harker,  of  Wood's  division,  was 
hurried  after  Beatty, — to  the  right  of  Rosecrans's 


5o  STONE'S   RIVER 

division  of  Thomas's  corps, — while  Hascall's  bri- 
gade was  held  as  a  mobile  body,  under  the  eye  of 
General  Wood  himself. 

Upon  Thomas  now  fell  a  burden  of  tremendous 
weight.  He  had  early  perceived  the  displacement 
of  Sheridan,  and  had  sent  two  brigades  of  Ros- 
seau's  division  to  reenforce  that  commander  and 
support  his  right.  Then  he  turned  to  face  one  of 
the  most  dangerous  and  furious  efforts  made  by 
the  foe  during  the  whole  day.  Hardee,  with  his 
whole  force,  was  moving  to  take  Sheridan  in  flank 
and  in  the  rear;  Cheatham,  of  Folk's  corps,  was 
advancing  against  Sheridan  in  front,  and  Withers 
was  preparing  to  leap  upon  Negley.  To  give  way 
here  would  be  fatal,  for  back  of  Thomas  and  of 
what  was  left  of  the  right  wing  Rosecrans  was 
hastily  arranging  a  new  battle-line  to  hold  the 
Nashville  Pike. 

The  commander  of  the  centre  seemed  ubi- 
quitous. Though  his  charger  never  broke  out  of 
the  slow  pace  that  had  given  its  master  the  nick- 
name of  "Old  Trot,"  Thomas  was  apparently 
in  all  places  at  once, — now  directing  the  firing  to 
repulse  a  charge,  now  placing  a  regiment  in  line, 
and  again  marking  a  point  to  which  his  troops 
must  retire  and  take  up  the  fight  anew. 

The  Confederate  infantry  now  pressed  for- 
ward in  a  frenzy  of  enthusiasm.  The  piercing 
"rebel  yell"  rose  triumphantly  above  the  roar  of 
cannon  and  the  bark  of  musketry,  and  many  regi- 


STONE'S   RIVER  51 

ments  pressed  clear  to  the  borders  of  the  cedars 
in  which  the  Union  troops  were  posted,  before 
they  had  to  retire  from  a  merciless  fire. 

Again  and  again  Hardee  and  Cheatham 
brought  their  men  to  the  charge.  The  exigencies 
of  the  battle  twisted  the  Union  line  into  strange 
shapes.  Here  a  brigade  was  in  a  half-circle  with 
a  concave  side  to  the  enemy;  another  presented  a 
convex  front  to  attack.  Miller's  brigade  of  Neg- 
ley's  division  was  like  a  triangle  without  the  base, 
and,  aided  by  splendid  artillery  service,  repulsed 
simultaneously  assaults  in  front  and  on  both  sides. 
But  many  trains  having  been  captured  or  swept 
away,  Sheridan's  men  found  themselves  out  of  am- 
munition, and  his  division  was  withdrawn,  leav- 
ing Negley's  right  and  Rosseau's  left  "in  the 
air."  Into  the  interval  poured  the  Confederate 
columns.  Thomas  was  compelled  to  withdraw  his 
two  divisions  to  an  improvised  line,  and  Negley 
and  Rosseau  reluctantly  faced  the  rear. 

The  firing  had  been  so  heavy  in  these  divisions 
that  the  cartridge-boxes  of  dead  and  wounded  had 
been  robbed  for  the  precious  ammunition.  Ros- 
seau made  the  movement  under  fire,  but,  reaching 
Thomas's  temporary  line,  turned  and  delivered 
such  a  blast  from  rifles  and  artillery  as  threw  back 
the  pursuing  enemy  and  left  the  field  covered  with 
bodies. 

Shepherd's  brigade  of  regulars  especially  dis- 
tinguished itself  here;  for,  firing  by  platoon  from 


52  STONE'S   RIVER 

flank  to  flank, — as  steadily  as  though  at  drill, — it 
cut  down  the  enemy  in  front  as  a  scythe  mows 
grain,  and  drove  away  a  greatly  superior  force, 
losing  in  a  few  minutes  one-third  of  its  whole 
number.  Negley's  division  was  almost  sur- 
rounded, and  had  to  cut  its  way, — sometimes  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet, — through  the  Confeder- 
ates, who  had  reached  its  rear.  In  the  movement 
this  division  had  to  abandon  six  guns. 

Palmer's  division,  which  was  already  fiercely 
engaged,  was  now  in  the  greatest  peril,  as  Neg- 
ley's retirement  left  an  unprotected  flank.  On  the 
right  Cruft's  brigade  was  almost  surrounded 
while  repulsing  a  frontal  attack;  but  Grose's  bri- 
gade, held  in  reserve,  changed  front  to  the  rear 
and  cleared  a  way.  Hazen,  at  the  apex  of  what 
was  known  as  the  "Round  Forest,"  met  repeated 
heavy  attacks,  but,  owing  to  superior  position  and 
artillery  support,  was  able  to  hold  his  own,  though 
losing  heavily.  As  Palmer  retired,  his  division 
established  connection  with  the  right  and  faced 
the  enemy  with  renewed  confidence. 

The  grand  wheel  had  now  traversed  the  full 
quarter  of  a  circle.  It  had  been  carried  out  with 
remarkable  consistency  and  with  remarkable 
speed  and  power.  Every  command  in  Bragg's 
army,  with  the  exception  of  his  reserve,  had  felt 
the  impulse  of  the  great  maneuver,  had  taken  a 
place  therein,  in  regular  order,  and,  at  first  glance, 
it  would  have  seemed  with  complete  success.  For 


STONE'S   RIVER  53 

the  entire  Union  army,  with  the  exception  of  a 
small  part  of  the  left  wing,  had  been  forced  from 
position.  Its  battle-front,  instead  of  facing 
squarely  east,  now  faced  south,  and  its  curving 
line  was  in  place  behind  the  Nashville  Pike, — its 
only  avenue  of  safety, — which  in  some  instances 
was  in  plain  sight  of  the  enemy  and  within  reach 
of  his  artillery  and  musketry.  But  though  Rose- 
crans  had  lost  heavily  in  men,  guns,  horses,  and 
ammunition,  Bragg  had  not  escaped  without  cost. 
Some  of  his  splendid  brigades  mustered  but  half  of 
the  strength  with  which  they  had  begun  the  battle, 
and  almost  all  the  men  were  so  exhausted  as  to  be 
unable  to  go  further.  Moreover,  they  faced  an 
army  of  men, — men  who  disliked  being  beaten, 
who  occupied  an  elevated  position  of  great 
strength,  who  had  secured  fresh  stores  of  ammuni- 
tion, who,  acutely  conscious  of  their  danger,  were 
resolved  not  to  yield  further,  and  who  actually, 
here  and  there,  showed  a  disposition  to  make  re- 
prisals upon  their  valiant  foe. 

But  Bragg  had  not  entirely  exhausted  his  re- 
sources. The  Union  left  lay  temptingly  near  him, 
and,  if  he  could  crush  or  turn  it,  the  rest  of  Rose- 
cran's  army  might  atill  be  his.  Fresh  troops  were 
needed  for  such  an  attempt,  but  the  five  brigades 
of  Breckinridge's  division  were  at  hand  and  they 
were  summoned  for  the  final  effort.  Breckenridge 
had  been  asked  for  reinforcements  early  in  the 
day,  but  he  had  seen  Van  Cleve's  big  division  start 


54  STONE'S    RIVER 

in  his  direction,  and,  apparently,  had  not  seen  it 
return  when  it  was  sent  flying  to  arrest  the  rout  of 
McCook's  corps.  He  had  also  been  ordered  to 
meet  some  reinforcements,  which  Bragg  had 
thought  were  coming  to  Rosecrans,  but  which  did 
not  appear;  and  consequently,  had  kept  his  di- 
vision intact.  Now  he  detached  the  brigades  of 
Adams  and  Jackson,  which,  dashing  through  the 
river,  threw  themselves  impetuously  upon  the 
Union  forces  in  the  "Round  Forest."  Upon 
Hazen's  sorely-tried  troops  the  brunt  of  the  as- 
sault fell,  but,  using  the  -railroad  embankment  as 
a  protection,  they  managed  to  hold  on.  Soon 
Adams  and  Jackson  turned  back,  shattered  beyond 
further  use. 

Now  Breckinridge  in  person  led  to  the  assault 
the  brigades  of  Preston  and  Palmer;  but  Hazen 
was  now  aided  by  whatever  regiments,  battalions, 
and  odds  and  ends  of  troops  could  be  spared  to 
him.  Preston  and  Palmer  were  not  only  driven 
back,  but  they  left  some  prisoners  as  a  result  of  a 
countercharge  by  a  Union  regiment. 

Here  ended  the  first  day's  battle. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  NIGHT  AND  THE  NEXT  DAY 

The  dusk  of  the  short  winter's  day  had  already 
come  on  when  the  last  desperate  charges  of  the 
Confederate  hosts  were  repelled.  As  though  by 
common  consent,  the  firing  ceased  almost  simul- 
taneously on  both  sides,  and  a  period  of  compar- 
ative calm  succeeded  the  storm  of  battle. 

Never  was  a  cessation  of  strife  more  welcome 
than  to  the  two  armies.  The  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland had  been  so  riven  and  torn  during  the 
struggle  as  to  bear  scarcely  any  resemblance  to  the 
compact  organization  of  the  morning.  Divisions 
had  been  swept  away  from  the  rest  of  their  corps, 
brigades  had  been  torn  away  from  divisions,  regi- 
ments from  brigades,  and  even  battalions  and  com- 
panies from  regiments.  It  was  in  very  truth  an 
improvised  battle-line, — the  line  that  had  clung 
to  the  Nashville  Pike  during  the  closing  hours  of 
the  engagement.  A  vast  number  of  individual 
soldiers, — not  by  any  means  all  skulkers,  but,  in 
many  cases,  men  who  had  become  separated  from 
their  own  commands  and  had  done  valiant  serv- 
ice wherever  opportunity  offered,  with  or  without 

55 


56  STONE'S   RIVER 

orders, — were  wandering  about  back  of  the  Union 
lines,  seeking  the  camp-fires  of  their  comrades. 
To  restore  a  semblance  of  order  and  alignment 
was  the  first  task  of  officers, — great  and  small, — 
and  it  was  hours  before  this  could  be  accomplished 
in  part.  It  was  the  intention  of  Rosecrans  to  for- 
bid fires,  for  fear  of  drawing  attacks  from  the 
enemy;  but  before  any  order  could  be  issued,  they 
were  lighted  all  along  the  line,  and  the  exhausted 
troops  got  an  opportunity  to  boil  coffee  and  toast 
bacon  before  sinking  down  to  sleep. 

On  the  Confederate  side  there  was  less  con- 
fusion. The  Army  of  the  Tennessee, — though 
clearly  fought  out  for  the  time  being, — had  pre- 
served far  more  of  the  autonomy  of  its  several 
commands,  and  as  the  camp-fires  were  kindled 
along  its  battle  front,  the  impression  was  universal 
that  the  fight  would  be  renewed  on  the  morrow. 
Bragg  himself  was  in  a  state  of  exultation,  for 
though  his  cherished  plan  had  not  yet  been  carried 
out,  he  felt  that  success  had  merely  been  deferred. 

There  was  a  council  of  the  principal  Federal 
officers  during  the  night  at  the  commanding  gen- 
eral's headquarters.  Rosecrans,  it  is  said,  had  in 
mind  a  retirement  of  a  few  miles  to  Overall's 
Creek,  but  this  was  given  up  when  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  new  position  was  scarcely  as  strong 
as  the  one  now  held,  and  offered  few  advantages. 
Then  somebody  suggested  the  question  of  retreat. 
There  is  a  tradition  to  the  effect  that  Thomas  had 


STONE'S   RIVER  57 

fallen  into  a  doze  during  the  talking,  but  that  he 
woke  up  when  this  unpleasant  word  was  uttered. 

"Retreat!"  he  exclaimed, — so  the  story  goes, — 
"This  army  can't  retreat!" 

This  assurance  seemed  to  satisfy  the  timid  ones, 
and  the  question  was  dropped  forthwith. 

New  Year's  Day,  1863,  dawned  clear  and  cold. 
During  the  night  every  effort  had  been  made  to 
strengthen  the  Union  position,  and  to  good  effect; 
for  Bragg  had  a  cloud  of  skirmishers  out  with  the 
dawn,  and  all  day  they  searched  the  line  in  every 
part,  at  times  being  aided  by  the  artillery.  But 
not  a  crevice  could  be  found,  and  the  Confederate 
maneuvers  at  no  time  developed  into  movements 
of  importance.  But  Wheeler's  Cavalry  found 
plenty  to  do,  and  its  capture  of  a  wagon-train 
caused  the  liveliest  rumors  of  disaster  among  the 
garrison  that  had  been  left  at  Nashville. 

Despite,  however,  the  activity  of  the  horsemen 
of  the  enemy,  Rosecrans  managed  to  get  through 
the  lines  a  considerable  store  of  rations,  ammuni- 
tion, and  other  supplies.  So  the  day  ended  with 
the  situation  much  as  it  had  been  when  the  day 
began,  except  that  the  soldiers  on  both  sides  had 
had  an  opportunity  to  restore  themselves  after  the 
intense  fatigue  of  the  first  day's  fight,  and  that 
order  had  been  evolved  out  of  the  chaos  into 
which  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  been 
thrown. 

One  change  in  the  situation, — at  the  time  re- 


5 8  STONE'S   RIVER 

garded  as  of  little  account,  but  which  was  to  have 
momentous  results, — had  been  made.  During  the 
day  Rosecrans  gave  some  scrutiny  to  Breckin- 
ridge's  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
which  had  retired  to  its  original  position  on 
Bragg's  right.  As  this  force  was  posted,  it  was 
too  far  away  to  be  watched  closely,  and  Rosecrans, 
as  a  precautionary  measure,  directed  Crittenden 
to  throw  Van  Cleve's  division,  now  under  Gen. 
Samuel  Beatty  (for  its  own  white-haired  com- 
mander had  been  wounded),  together  with 
Grosse's  brigade,  across  the  ford  to  a  position  in 
Breckenridge's  front.  The  movement,  which  had 
for  its  purpose  little  more  than  observation,  was 
accomplished  without  interference  on  the  after- 
noon of  January  i,  1863. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  SECOND  OF  JANUARY,   1863 

For  the  greater  part  of  the  next  day  the  two 
armies  merely  rested  on  their  arms.  With  food 
and  rest,  the  feeling  of  confidence,  which  had  been 
somewhat  shaken  in  the  Union  Army,  began  to 
revive,  and  the  soldiers  exhibited  a  cheerful  tone. 
The  Confederate  forces,  however,  showed  a  con- 
trary spirit.  There  was  deep  chagrin  in  all  ranks, 
because  the  work  that  had  been  so  bravely  begun 
was  not  resumed  and  carried  to  a  triumphant  end; 
while  criticisms  of  the  general  commanding  began 
to  be  exchanged  with  freedom  among  the  officers 
highest  in  rank.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  gossip 
reached  Bragg's  ears  and  that  he  was  stung  to 
the  quick  by  it.  It  is  possible,  too,  that  it  led  him 
to  order  the  movement  that  resulted  in  the  final 
scene  of  the  battle. 

During  his  repeated  examinations  of  the  field, 
Bragg  had  noticed  the  Union  detachment  that  had 
been  thrown  across  the  river  in  Breckinridge's 
front,  and  he  now  determined  to  dislodge  it.  In 
his  official  reports  he  lets  it  be  understood  that 
he  merely  wanted  to  drive  away  a  force  that  was 

59 


60  STONE'S   RIVER 

posted  in  an  advantageous  position  for  observa- 
tion and  that  might,  if  re-enforced,  be  able  to 
make  a  dangerous  attack  upon  his  army, — for  it 
could  enfilade  his  whole  line.  But,  if  dislodge- 
ment  were  all  that  was  intended,  it  is  hard  to 
understand  why  Bragg  should  have  organized 
such  a  heavy  column  for  a  slight  task.  It  may  well 
be  suspected  that  the  Confederate  Commander 
saw  an  opportunity  to  crush  the  Union  left  and, 
in  the  confusion  necessarily  ensuing,  to  drive  the 
whole  Federal  Army  from  the  field  in  rout. 

Bragg  gave  to  Breckinridge  10,000  of  his  best 
fighting  men,  including  2,000  cavalry  and  ample 
supports  of  artillery.  At  the  head  of  this  formid- 
able column,  Breckenridge  descended  upon  the 
Union  troops  in  his  immediate  front,  at  4  p.  m., 
January  2.  The  blow  fell  with  the  swiftness  and 
force  of  a  hurricane.  Both  Van  Cleve's  division 
and  Grosse's  brigade  had  lost  heavily  in  the  previ- 
ous fighting,  and  their  ranks  were  too  thin  to  offer 
effectual  resistance.  A  few  volleys  of  musketry 
and  a  few  rounds  of  artillery  were  fired,  and  then 
they  broke  and  fled  to  the  ford,  closely  pursued 
by  the  yelling  Confederate  host. 

By  a  singular  chance,  not  a  single  Union  gen- 
eral officer  was  near  this  part  of  the  field  at  the 
time.  They  were,  in  fact,  around  the  centre  and 
right,  against  which  Bragg,  as  a  ruse,  had  opened 
a  heavy  artillery  fire.  The  brigade  nearest  the 
ford  was  under  the  command  of  John  F.  Miller,  a 


STONE'S   RIVER  61 

young  Indiana  colonel,  who  had  not  yet  received 
his  stars.  It  was  apparent  to  him  that  Brecken- 
ridge's  charge,  unless  checked,  would  result  dis- 
astrously to  the  army;  and  he  broached  the  sub- 
ject of  a  countercharge  to  an  officer  of  like  grade 
of  another  brigade.  He  was  assured  of  support. 
Miller  sent  an  orderly  to  find  some  general  of- 
ficer to  authorize  the  movement,  and  drew  up  his 
men  in  readiness.  He  had  barely  1,500  with 
which  he  might  hope  to  check  10,000,  flushed  with 
victory.  In  a  few  moments  the  crisis  was  at  hand, 
and  Miller  was  still  awaiting  orders.  His  brigade 
opened  ranks  to  let  through  the  fugitives,  and 
then  Miller,  placing  himself  at  the  head  of  his 
men,  spurred  his  horse  into  the  water.  He  was 
in  mid-stream,  when  the  orderly  returned  with 
the  news  that  General  Palmer,  the  only  general 
officer  to  be  found,  had  forbidden  the  movement. 

"It  is  too  late  now,"  replied  Miller,  and  draw- 
ing his  sword,  he  gave  the  order  to  charge. 

The  very  audacity  of  this  step  was  its  success. 
It  is  probable  that  the  Confederates  believed 
Miller  to  be  leading  an  overwhelming  force,  for 
they  stopped,  fired  a  few  shots,  and  then  began  to 
retreat.  With  fixed  bayonets,  Miller's  men  pur- 
sued, and  now,  with  quick  perception  of  the  op- 
portunity, other  Union  commands  joined  in  the 
charge.  Perhaps  a  half  mile  had  been  traversed 
when  the  Confederates  showed  signs  of  rallying. 
But  as  their  lines  were  halted  and  rearranged, 


62  STONE'S   RIVER 

the  missiles  of  death  from  half  a  hundred  can- 
non,— drawn  hastily  together  by  Major  Menden- 
hall,  Crittenden's  chief  of  artillery,  and  posted 
on  a  hill  which  commanded  the  whole  field, — sud- 
denly fell  among  them.  They  fled  again,  leaving 
on  the  ground  2,000  dead  and  wounded, — the 
fruit  of  an  action  of  less  than  an  hour. 

This  ended  the  battle  of  Stone's  River.  For 
another  twenty-four  hours  the  two  armies  con- 
fronted each  other  with  no  fight  of  importance. 
During  the  night  of  January  3,  Bragg  retreated 
unmolested.  He  reported  having  received  infor- 
mation that  Rosecrans  was  being  reenforced,  but 
in  this  again  he  may  be  suspected  of  a  euphemism. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  retreat  had  been  advised 
at  a  council  of  his  principal  generals,  two  of 
whom, — Withers  and  Cheatham, — united  in  the 
blunt  statement  over  their  own  signatures  that  he 
had  only  three  reliable  divisions  left  and  that 
these  were,  to  a  certain  extent,  demoralized.  Most 
of  his  officers  also  assured  him,  with  equal  frank- 
ness, that  he  ought  to  give  up  the  command  of  the 
army, — advice  that  he  did  not  heed;  and  Polk, 
for  writing  to  this  effect  to  the  Confederate  Presi- 
dent, was  placed  under  arrest;  but  he  was  after- 
ward released. 


CHAPTER  VII 

WHAT  MIGHT  HAVE  BEEN, AND  WHAT  WAS 

The  Battle  of  Stone's  River  produced  profound 
disappointment  both  in  the  North  and  in  the 
South.  Claimed  as  a  victory  by  both  sides,  the 
first  fruits  fell  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
which  had  not  only  held  the  field  but  had  com- 
pelled the  retirement  of  its  adversary  and  the  re- 
linquishment  by  the  latter  of  strategic  positions 
and  domination  over  considerable  areas.  But  as 
the  weeks  passed  without  developments  of  other 
striking  results,  the  Northern  people  felt  that  the 
victory  had  been  little  more  than  technical,  and 
that  the  battle  was  another  of  the  practically  in- 
decisive contests  so  frequent  at  that  period. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Southern  people  were 
mortified  and  chagrined  at  a  defeat  suffered  when 
their  cause  was  prospering  in  almost  all  other 
quarters.  They  were  not  more  given  to  analyzing 
strategic  and  tactical  features  than  their  Northern 
enemies,  but  they  were  able  to  realize  that  their 
second  army  in  size  and  importance  had  lost 
thousands  of  soldiers,  and  that  it  has  been  driven 
out  of  Middle  Tennessee,  and  away  from  the 
vicinity  of  the  State  capital,  the  recovery  of  which 

63 


64  STONE'S   RIVER 

had  always  been  a  cherished  object  of  their  hearts. 
The  opposition  to  Bragg,  both  in  and  out  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  became  intensified  from 
the  time  the  retirement  from  Murfreesboro  was 
ordered. 

It  was  perhaps  natural  that  the  outcome  was 
thus  viewed  in  the  two  sections,  for  it  is  in  the 
light  of  what  it  might  have  been, — rather  than 
what  it  was, — that  Stone's  River  must  be  judged. 
Union  victory  upon  that  field  did  not,  it  is  true,  re- 
veal results  of  transcendent  importance,  but  Con- 
federate victory, — at  one  time  so  near, — would 
have  been  followed  by  the  weightiest  and  most 
far-reaching  consequences.  Had  Bragg  been  able 
to  drive  his  infantry  across  the  Nashville  pike  on 
the  last  day  of  1862,  or  had  he  been  able  to 
crush  the  Union  left  on  the  second  of  January, 
1863,  the  capture  or  destruction, — whole  or  par- 
tial,— of  his  enemy  would  have  been  one  of  the 
least  of  these  consequences.  y^For  the  way  to  the 
Ohio  would  then  have  been  open,  and  Cincinnati 
and  other  opulent  Northern  cities  would  have  been 
at  the  mercy  of  Confederate  arms.  Vicksburg 
would  not  have  been  an  historic  name,  for  over- 
whelming forces  could  have  been  turned  against 
Grant  to  crush  him,  or  urive  him  from  Missis- 
sippi. Tennessee, — second  State  in  population 
below  Mason  and  Dixon's  line,  and  first  in  such 
food  as  armies  consume, — would  have  been  held 
to  furnish  the  vital  recruits  and  supplies  to  the 


STONE'S   RIVER  65 

Confederacy.  East  Tennessee  would  have  waited 
in  vain  for  the  relieving  Northern  forces.  Ken- 
tucky and  Missouri  might  have  been  wrested  from 
Union  control,  and  Arkansas  freed  from  the  pres- 
ence of  the  invader.  Finally,  Europe's  recogni- 
tion, with  the  manifold  complexities  for  the  North 
that  must  have  ensued  therefrom,  could  have  been 
no  longer  logically  denied  to  the  Richmond  gov- 
ernment.} 

After  Stone's  River,  Bragg's  battered  battalions 
retired  30  to  40  miles  away, — to  the  line  of  Duck 
Diver, — and  there  maintained  an  attitude  of  de- 
fiance for  6  months.  It  took  that  period  for 
Rosecrans  to  restore  the  ravages  of  battle  in  his 
army.  Wheeler,  Morgan,  and  Forrest, — the 
cavalry  chieftans, — meanwhile,  kept  up  a  series  of 
raids  upon  Rosecrans's  long  line  of  communica- 
tions,— raids  that  sorely  tried  that  commander, 
pestered  as  he  was  by  constant  injunctions  from 
Washington  to  move  forward.  But  in  June, 
1863,  having  at  length  accumulated  sufficient  sup- 
plies, the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  started  the 
campaign  that  was  to  drive  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  out  of  the  State  from  which  it  took  its 
name.  Then  came  another  halt;  but  in  September 
the  Union  forces  again  advanced  and  the  Con- 
federates again  retired. 

At  Chickamauga  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
reinforced  by  Longstreet  and  Buckner,  turned, 
and,  inflicting  a  bloody  defeat  upon  the  Army  of 


66  STONE'S   RIVER 

the  Cumberland,  locked  it  up  in  the  fastness  of 
Chattanooga.  But  Bragg  was  unable  to  gather 
substantial  fruits  from  his  victory.  At  Mission- 
ary Ridge,  in  December,  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland led  in  the  movement  that  broke  the  battle- 
front  of  its  historic  adversary.  Thenceforth  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee, — fighting  bravely  at  every 
turn, — was  obliged  by  the  weight  of  opposing 
numbers  to  retire  further  and  further  into  the 
South.  At  Resaca,  at  Dalton,  at  Kenesaw  Moun- 
tain, at  Atlanta,  and  at  a  score  of  other  places  it 
showed  the  qualities  of  valor  and  endurance  that 
had  already  won  it  deserved  renown.  But  it  never 
looked  to  the  North  again  until  the  latter  days  of 
1864,  when  Hood  summoned  it  for  its  last  great 
adventure, — that  desperate  leap  past  Sherman, 
which  was  to  end  in  utter  rout  before  the  ramparts 
of  Nashville. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  lost  in  the  Stone's 
River  campaign  1,730  killed,  7,802  wounded, 
3,717  captured  and  missing;  a  total  of  13,249. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  lost  1,294  killed, 
7,945  wounded,  1,027  captured  or  missing;  a  total 
of  10,266. 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX 

NOTES   TO   INTRODUCTION 

"In  the  second  half  of  this  year  (1862)  the  Con- 
federates failed  to  gain  control  of  Maryland  and 
Kentucky,  but  made  head  strongly  and  at  the  end 
of  it  were  at  the  height  of  their  power,  with  the 
North  badly  defeated  at  all  points  save  one.  The 
writer  considers  that  the  battle  of  Stone's  River, 
or  Murfreesboro,  on  December  31st,  was  the  military 
turning-point  of  the  war,  though  the  Confederates 
made  various  strokes  at  different  times  for  political 
purposes,  which,  had  they  succeeded,  might  have 
attained  their  end,  the  chief  of  which  was  the  cam- 
paign of  Gettysburg.  From  a  purely  military  point 
of  view,  however,  nothing  could  save  the  Con- 
federacy unless  the  results  of  Stone's  River  were 
undone.  The  year  1863  opened  with  the  Confeder- 
ates fought  out;  they  had  made  their  effort  but 
could  not  maintain  it,  and  had  failed  to  secure  the 
centre  of  the  strategical  line  which  was  vital  for 
both  sides." — "The  American  Civil  War,"  Formby; 
London,  John  Murray,  1910. 

NOTES   TO   CHAPTER   II. 

"...  That  my  opinion  was  founded  upon  a 
false  estimate  of  the  facts  was  the  very  least  part 
of  my  fault.  I  did  not  perceive  the  gross  impro- 
priety of  such  an  utterance  from  a  cabinet  minister, 
of  a  power  united  in  blood  and  language,  and  bound 
to  loyal  neutrality;  the  case  being  further  exag- 

69 


70  STONE'S   RIVER 

gerated  by  the  fact  that  we  were  already,  so  to 
speak,  under  indictment  before  the  world,  for  not — 
as  was  alleged — having  strictly  enforced  the  laws 
of  neutrality  in  the  matter  of  the  cruisers.  My 
offence  was  indeed  only  a  mistake,  but  one  of  in- 
credible grossness,  and  with  such  consequences  of 
offence  and  alarm  attached  to  it,  that  my  failing 
to  perceive  them  justly  exposed  me  to  very  severe 
blame.  .  .  .  " — Gladstonian  fragment,  "Life  of 
Gladstone,"  Morley;  New  York.  The  Macmillan 
Company,  1911. 

NOTE   TO   CHAPTER   III. 

"Further  to  mislead  the  enemy  as  to  the  point 
from  which  the  attack  was  to  be  made,  long  lines 
of  camp-fires  were  started  on  McCook's  right  and 
commands  given  by  staff-officers  to  imaginary  regi- 
ments in  tones  loud  enough  to  be  heard  by  the 
enemy's  skirmishers,  to  induce  the  Confederates  to 
think  that  our  line  extended  much  further  to  the 
right  than  it  actually  did.  I  have  always  doubted 
whether  Bragg  was  misled  or  deceived  by  this  sub- 
terfuge ;  and  not  unlikely  he  considered  it  a  con- 
fession of  weakness  on  our  right  and  formed  his 
own  plans  accordingly." — "The  Murfreesboro  Cam- 
paign," Otis;  Boston.  Papers  of  the  Military  His- 
torical Society  of  Massachusetts,  Vol.  VII,  1908. 

NOTES  TO   CHAPTER  VI. 

"At  this  juncture,  Colonel  John  F.  Miller,  followed 
by  a  portion  of  Stanley's  brigade,  charged  with  his 


STONE'S   RIVER  71 

brigade  across  the  river.  Disregarding  an  order 
from  a  general  officer,  not  his  immediate  com- 
mander, to  desist  from  so  hazardous  an  adventure, 
he  dashed  over  and  fell  furiously  upon  the  foe,  al- 
ready in  rapid  retreat.  The  right  of  Miller's  line 
was  supported  by  the  Eighteenth  Ohio,  and  por- 
tions of  the  Thirty-seventh  Indiana  and  Seventy- 
eighth  Pennsylvania,  of  Stanley's  Brigade.  Moving 
on  the  opposite  bank,  his  left,  was  Grose's  brigade, 
which  had  changed  front  and  resisted  the  enemy, 
when  Price  and  Grider  gave  ground,  and  in  his  rear 
were  Hazen's  brigade  and  portions  of  Beatly's  divi- 
sion. Miller  reached  a  battery  in  position  and, 
charging  with  the  Seventy-eighth  Pennsylvania, 
Sixty-ninth  and  Seventy-fourth  Ohio,  and  Nine- 
teenth Illinois,  the  Twenty-first  Ohio,  striking  op- 
portunely on  the  left,  captured  four  guns  and  the 
colors  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Tennessee  Regiment.  .  .  ." 
— "History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  Van 
Home;  Cincinnati,  Robert  Clarke  &  Co.,  1875. 

"Miller  sent  his  staff  officers  and  orderlies,  Lieu- 
tenant (afterward  Brigadier-General)  Henry  Chi- 
ney,  Lieutenant  Ayers,  and  Major  A.  B.  Bonnaffin  (I 
repeat  that  I  am  writing  now  what  I  saw  with  my 
own  eyes  and  heard  with  my  own  ears)  to  scour  the 
field  and  ask  permission  to  cross  the  stream  to  Van 
Cleve's  relief.  Only  one  such  officer  could  be  found, 
General  John  M.  Palmer  (of  Illinois)  and  from  him 
came  instead  of  the  desired  permission  a  positive 
prohibition — an  order  not  to  cross.  The  other  two 
brigade  commanders,  belonging  to  the  division,  Gen- 
eral Spear  of  Tennessee  and  Colonel  T.  R.  Stanley, 
of  the  Eighteenth  Ohio,  were  not  present.  General 


72  STONE'S   RIVER 

Negley,  the  division  commander,  was  not  to  be 
found.  .  .  . 

"Miller  found  himself  the  ranking  officer  present 
with  the  division  and  realized  that  the  decision 
fraught  with  so  much  importance  lay  with  him. 
He  was  surrounded  by  a  group  of  regimental  com- 
manders who  alternately  studied  the  field  and  his 
face!  .  .  .  He  turned  to  the  officers  around  him 
saying  quietly : 

"  'I  will  charge  them.' 

"  'And  I'll  follow  you,'  exclaimed  the  gallant  Scott, 
wheeling  and  plunging  his  spurs  into  his  steed  to 
hasten  back  to  his  regiment  (the  Nineteenth  Illi- 
nois). Colonel  Stoughton  of  the  Eleventh  Michi- 
gan and  other  regimental  commanders  belonging 
to  the  Twenty-ninth  brigade  echoed  Scott's  en- 
thusiastic adherence  and  they,  too,  started  for  their 
troops." — ''God's  War,"  Vance.  London,  New  York. 
F.  Tennyson  Neely,  1899. 


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